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In a market with short term agents and heterogeneous information, when liquidity trading 
displays persistence, prices reflect average expectations about fundamentals and  liquidity 
trading. Informed investors exploit a private learning channel to infer the demand of liquidity 
traders from the order flow to anticipate the evolution of the future aggregate demand for the 
stock. This yields multiple equilibria which can be ranked in terms of  liquidity and 
informational efficiency. Our results have implications for the impact of High  Frequency 
Trading (HFT) on market quality and for the role of average expectations in asset pricing. We 
show that with persistence HFT may enhance informational efficiency and liquidity but only 
by creating an unstable equilibrium. In the equilibrium with  high (low) informational 
efficiency, prices are closer to (farther away from) fundamentals  compared to consensus 
estimates. 
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We study the drivers of asset prices in a two-period market where short-term, informed, compet-
itive, risk-averse agents trade on account of private information and to accommodate liquidity
supply, facing a persistent demand from liquidity traders.
Short term speculation ranks high on the regulatory agenda, testifying policy makers' con-
cern with the possibly destabilizing impact it has on the market. For instance, the report on
the causes of the \Flash-Crash" issued by the stas of the CFTC-SEC highlights the role of
High Frequency Trading (HFT) { a class of market players who engage in extremely short-term
strategies { in exacerbating the sharp price drop that characterized the crash. Relatedly, policy
makers' concern over the role played by nancial markets in the current crisis has reanimated
the debate over the means to curb short termism via the introduction of a transaction tax (the
so-called \Tobin-tax"). At the same time it is claimed that HFT improves liquidity (see, e.g.,
Hendershott, Jones, and Menkveld (2010)), thus playing a benecial role in the market. The
jury is still out on the eects of HFT and, more in general, on the impact of short term specu-
lation. The issue has a long tradition in economic analysis. Indeed, short term trading is at the
base of Keynes' beauty contest view of nancial markets, according to which what matters are
the average expectations of the average expectations of investors in an innite regress of higher
order beliefs. In this context it has been claimed that traders tend to put a disproportionately
high weight on public information in their forecast of asset prices (see Allen, Morris, and Shin
(2006)).
In this paper we present a two-period model of short term trading with asymmetric in-
formation in the tradition of dynamic noisy rational expectations models (see, e.g., Singleton
(1987), Brown and Jennings (1989)). We advance the understanding of the eects of short
horizons on market quality, presenting a conciliation of the conicting evidence on HFT. We
also establish the limits of the beauty contest analogy for nancial markets, and deliver sharp
predictions on asset pricing which are consistent with the received empirical evidence (including
noted anomalies).
Assuming that informed investors have short horizons and that, due to persistence, the
demand of liquidity traders is predictable, allows us to capture important features of actual
markets. Indeed, a short term investor's concern over the price at which he unwinds, will make
him more sensitive to the possibility to extrapolate patterns on the evolution of the future
aggregate demand from the observation of the current aggregate demand for the stock. With
correlated liquidity trading, this implies that not only \fundamentals" information, but also
any information on the orders placed by uninformed investors becomes relevant to predict the
future price.1 The fact that both information on fundamentals and on liquidity trading matters
is a crucial determinant of equilibrium and market quality properties.
We nd that with heterogeneous information and short horizons, liquidity trading persis-
1This appears to be especially true for HFTs that use \order anticipation" algorithms to uncover patterns
within market data which provide information into large institutional order ows (see the January 2010 SEC
Concept Release on Equity Market Structure, and Scott Patterson, June 30, 2010, \Fast Traders Face O with
Big Investors Over `Gaming,'" Wall Street Journal).
2tence yields multiple equilibria. This is so since informed investors use their private signals
on the fundamentals also to infer the demand of liquidity traders from the rst period price,
to anticipate the impact that liquidity traders have on the price at which they unwind their
positions. In this way investors exploit a private learning channel from the price (as in Amador
and Weill (2010) and Manzano and Vives (2011)).
The dual role of fundamentals information is at the base of equilibrium multiplicity. The
intuition for this result is as follows. First period informed investors use their private signal to
anticipate the impact of fundamentals and, when liquidity trading is persistent, that of the rst
period liquidity trading on the second period price, at which they unwind. The more the second
period price reects rst period liquidity trading, the less their private signal is useful to predict
the liquidation price, and the lower is their response to private information. This, in turn, makes
the rst period price reect more liquidity trading, and less private information. As a result
the eect of private information impounded in the price by second period investors prevails
over that coming from rst period investors. This generates adverse selection, magnifying the
second period price impact of trades and augmenting rst period investors' uncertainty over the
liquidation price, further lowering their response to private information. In this equilibrium,
the response to private information is low, and the second period market is thin. Conversely,
the more the second period price reects the fundamentals, the more investors' private signal
is useful to predict the liquidation price, and the larger is the response to private information.
This, makes the rst period price reect less liquidity trading, and more private information.
As a result, the eect of private information impounded in the price by rst period investors
prevails over that coming from second period investors. In this case there is favorable selection,
which enhances second period liquidity and lowers investors' uncertainty over the liquidation
price, and further boosts their reaction to private information. In this equilibrium the response
to private information is high and the price impact of a unit of liquidity demand is negative due
to favorable selection. When liquidity trading is transient, the dual role of private information
vanishes, and a unique equilibrium arises.
Thus, with persistent liquidity trading, two self-fullling equilibria arise: in one equilibrium
the market is thin, and prices are poorly informationally ecient. In the other equilibrium, the
opposite occurs, with a thick market and highly informationally ecient prices. We show that
in the latter (former) equilibrium, rst period investors engage in a \conditional" momentum
(reversal) strategy. Indeed, in equilibrium investors anticipate the price at which they trade,
so that factoring out the impact of rst period public information, the covariation of future
returns could be either due to liquidity trading or fundamentals information. In the equilibrium
with high (low) liquidity, as prices are closer to (farther away from) fundamentals, the second
(rst) eect prevails, and returns positively (negatively) covary around their means. As a
consequence, when estimating a positive order imbalance investors chase the market (take the
other side of the market), anticipating a trend (reversal) in the price at which they unwind
their positions.
Finally, studying the stability of the equilibrium solutions, we show that the high liquidity
3equilibrium is unstable according to the best reply dynamics. The results are robust to intro-
ducing residual uncertainty about the liquidation value. In this case there are potentially three
equilibria and it is possible to show that an unexpected increase in residual uncertainty may
induce a price crash.2
Other authors nd that in the presence of short horizons multiple equilibria can arise (see,
e.g., Spiegel (1998) and Watanabe (2008)). However, in these cases multiplicity arises out of the
bootstrap nature of expectations in the steady state equilibrium of an innite horizon model
with overlapping generations of two-period lived investors. Spiegel (1998) studies the model
with no asymmetric information.3 Watanabe (2008) extends the model of Spiegel (1998) to
account for the possibility that investors have heterogeneous short-lived private information.
However, in his case too the analysis concentrates on the steady state equilibrium, which does
not make his results directly comparable to ours.4
Our results are related to and have implications for four strands of the literature.
First, our paper is related to the literature that investigates the relationship between the
impact of short-term investment horizons on prices and investors' reaction to their private
signals (see, e.g. Singleton (1987), Brown and Jennings (1989), Froot, Scharfstein, and Stein
(1992), Dow and Gorton (1994), Vives (1995), Cespa (2002), Albagli (2011) and Vives (2008) for
a survey). If prices are semi-strong ecient (as in Vives (1995)) then there is no private learning
channel from prices since the price is a sucient statistic for public information. Brown and
Jennings (1989), instead analyze a model in which prices are not semi-strong ecient, with short
term investors and where liquidity trading can be correlated. Their work provides a rationale
for \technical analysis," showing how in the absence of semi-strong eciency the sequence of
transaction prices provides more information than the current stock price to forecast the nal
payo. We argue that lacking semi-strong eciency, in the presence of correlated liquidity
trading, rst period investors have a private learning channel from the price which provides
them with additional information on the future stock price. We also provide a closed form
characterization of the equilibrium, emphasizing the role of this private learning channel in
generating equilibrium multiplicity.
Second, our paper is also related to the growing literature on HFT. Indeed, our short term
investors can be seen as high frequency traders who use private information to read the pub-
lic order ow which, in view of liquidity traders' demand correlation, provides insights into
the evolution of the future aggregate demand.5 Hendershott and Riordan (2010) nd that
high frequency traders orders have a permanent price impact which is larger than that of
2Multiple, self-fullling equilibria can also arise because of participation externalities, as e.g. in Admati and
Peiderer (1988), and Pagano (1989). In our context multiplicity is due to a purely informational eect.
3Our model with no private information is akin to a nite horizon version of Spiegel (1998) and as we show
in Corollary 5, in this case we obtain a unique equilibrium.
4Relatedly, Dennert (1991) studies an OLG extension of Grossman and Stiglitz (1980), concentrating on the
steady state solution. In his setup too private information is short-lived, which impedes second period investors'
inference about the information held by rst period investors.
5In this respect, our results are also related to the literature that studies the ability of the non-informational
component of total imbalances to predict stock returns (see, e.g. Coval and Staord (2007), and Hendershott
and Seasholes (2009)).
4\slow" human traders. This allows the price to adjust more rapidly toward the (information-
ally) ecient price. Based on this evidence, Biais, Foucault, and Moinas (2011) assume that
high frequency traders are able to process information before \slow" traders. This generates
a negative externality which is responsible for excessive investment in HFT compared to a
utilitarian welfare-maximization benchmark. Our model provides an explanation for high fre-
quency traders' superior ability to impound fundamentals information. In the high liquidity
equilibrium due to the the private learning channel from prices high frequency traders escalate
their response to private information, making prices more informationally ecient. However,
as argued above, this equilibrium is unstable, which implies that in our setup HFT may induce
fragility.
Third, the paper is related to the work that studies the inuence of Higher Order Expecta-
tions (HOEs) on asset prices (see Allen, Morris, and Shin (2006), Bacchetta and van Wincoop
(2008), Kondor (2009), and Nimark (2007)). Allen, Morris, and Shin (2006) nds that when
prices are driven by HOEs about fundamentals, they underweight private information (with
respect to the optimal statistical weight) and are farther away from fundamentals compared
to consensus. We show that in the unique equilibrium that obtains when liquidity trading is
transient, investors dampen their response to private information and this result holds. A sim-
ilar result also holds in the equilibrium with low liquidity when liquidity trading is persistent.
However, along the equilibrium with high liquidity the price is more strongly tied to funda-
mentals compared to consensus, and overweights average private information (compared to the
optimal statistical weight).6 Bacchetta and van Wincoop (2006) study the role of HOEs in the
FX market. They show that HOEs worsen the signal extraction problem that investors face
when observing changes in the exchange rate that originate from trades based on fundamen-
tals information and hedging motives. In our setup this happens in the equilibrium with low
liquidity, whereas in the equilibrium with high liquidity, investors' strong reaction to private
information eases o the signal extraction problem.
Finally, the paper is also related to the literature on limits to arbitrage. In this respect, our
multiplicity result is reminiscent of De Long et al. (1990), but in a model with fully rational
traders, and a nite horizon. Thus, our paper naturally relates to the strand of this literature
that views limits to arbitrage as the analysis of how \non-fundamental demand shocks" impact
asset prices in models with rational agents (Gromb and Vayanos (2010), Vayanos and Woolley
(2008)). Our contribution in this respect is twofold: rst we prove that when such shocks
display persistence, they impact in a non-trivial way the information extraction process of
rational investors, generating implications for price eciency and market liquidity. Second, we
relate these ndings to the literature on return predictability. In fact, along the high liquidity
equilibrium, we show that momentum arises at short horizons, while at long horizons reversal
occurs in any equilibrium. Intuitively, momentum is the result of two forces. On the one hand,
with persistence, the impact sign of any anticipated rst period order imbalance on second and
third period expected returns is the same; on the other hand, as we argued above, along the
6In a related paper, we show that a similar conclusion holds in a model with long term investors (see Cespa
and Vives (2011)).
5equilibrium with high liquidity the conditional covariance of returns is positive. Our results
are thus in line with the empirical ndings on return anomalies that document the existence of
positive return autocorrelation at short horizons, and negative autocorrelation at long horizons
(Jegadeesh and Titman (1993), and De Bondt and Thaler (1985)). Our model also predicts
that momentum is related to a high volume of informational trading, in line with the evidence
in Llorente, Michaely, Saar, and Wang (2002).
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In the next section we analyze the static
benchmark. In the following section, we study the two-period extension and present the mul-
tiplicity result, relating it to liquidity traders' persistence. In the following sections we relate
our results to the literature on HFT, Higher Order Expectations and asset pricing. The nal
section summarizes our results and discusses their empirical implications. Most of the proofs
are relegated to the appendix.
1 The static benchmark
Consider a one-period stock market where a single risky asset with liquidation value v, and a
risk-less asset with unitary return are traded by a continuum of risk-averse, informed investors
in the interval [0;1] together with liquidity traders. We assume that v  N( v; 1
v ). Investors
have CARA preferences (denote with  the risk-tolerance coecient) and maximize the expected
utility of their wealth: Wi = (v   p)xi.7 Prior to the opening of the market every informed
investor i obtains private information on v, receiving a signal si = v + i, i  N(0; 1
 ),
and submits a demand schedule (generalized limit order) to the market X(si;p) indicating the
desired position in the risky asset for each realization of the equilibrium price.8 Assume that
v and i are independent for all i, and that error terms are also independent across investors.
Liquidity traders submit a random demand u (independent of all other random variables in
the model), where u  N(0; 1
u ). We denote by Ei[Y ], Vari[Y ] the expectation and the
variance of the random variable Y formed by an investor i, conditioning on the private and
public information he has: Ei[Y ] = E[Y jsi;p], Vari[Y ] = Var[Y jsi;p]. Finally, we make the
convention that, given v, the average signal
R 1
0 sidi equals v almost surely (i.e. errors cancel
out in the aggregate:
R 1
0 idi = 0),9 and denote by  E[v] =
R 1
0 Ei[v]di investors' average opinion
(the \consensus" opinion) about v.
In the above CARA-normal framework, a symmetric rational expectations equilibrium
(REE) is a set of trades contingent on the information that investors have, fX(si;p) for i 2 [0;1]g
and a price functional P(v;u) (measurable in (v;u)), such that investors in [0;1] optimize given
their information and the market clears:
Z 1
0
xidi + u = 0:
7We assume, without loss of generality with CARA preferences, that the non-random endowment of informed
investors is zero.
8The unique equilibrium in linear strategies of this model is symmetric.
9See Section 3.1 in the Technical Appendix of Vives (2008) for a justication of the convention.
6Given the above denition, it is easy to verify that a unique, symmetric equilibrium in
linear strategies exists in the class of equilibria with a price functional of the form P (v;u) (see,






a = ; (1)
denotes the responsiveness to private information, i  (Vari[v]) 1, and E = =i is the
optimal statistical (Bayesian) weight to private information. Imposing market clearing the
equilibrium price is given by




= E[vjp] + E[ujp]; (3)





Equations (2), and (3) show that the price can be given two alternative representations. Accord-
ing to the rst one, the price reects the consensus opinion investors hold about the liquidation
value plus the impact of the demand from liquidity traders (multiplied by the risk-tolerance
weighted uncertainty over the liquidation value). Indeed, in a static market owing to CARA
and normality, an investor's demand is proportional to the expected gains from trade Ei[v] p.
As the price aggregates all investors' demands, it reects the consensus opinion  E[v] shocked
by the orders of liquidity traders.
According to (3), the anticipated impact of liquidity traders' demand moves the price away
from the semi-strong ecient price. Therefore,  captures the \inventory" related component
of market liquidity.10 Liquidity traders' demand has an additional impact on the price, through
the eect it produces on E[vjp]. This is an adverse selection eect which adds to the inventory








where  = 1=Var[vjp] = v + a2u.11
10When risk averse investors accommodate an expectedly positive demand of liquidity traders, they require a
compensation against the possibility that the liquidation value is higher than the public expectation (if instead
E[ujp] < 0, investors require to pay a price lower than E[vjp] to cover the risk that v < E[vjp]). Such a
compensation is larger, the higher is the uncertainty investors face (captured by ) and the wider is their
expected exposure to the liquidity traders' shock (their expected inventory, E[ujp]).
11The adverse selection eect comes from the signal extraction problem dealers face in this market: since
a > 0, if investors on average have good news they buy the asset, and E[vjp] increases, reecting this information.
However, this eect cannot be told apart from the buying pressure of liquidity traders, which also makes E[vjp]
7Finally, note that the private signal in this case only serves to forecast the liquidation value
v. In the next section we will argue that due to persistence, liquidity traders' demand impacts
the order ow across dierent trading dates. In this case investors also use their private signals
to extrapolate the demand of liquidity traders from the order ow to anticipate the impact
this has on future prices. This additional use of private information will be responsible for
equilibrium multiplicity.
2 A two-period market with short term investors
Consider now a two-period extension of the market analyzed in the previous section. At date 1
(2), a continuum of short-term investors in the interval [0;1] enters the market, loads a position
in the risky asset which it unwinds in period 2 (3). Investor i has CARA preferences (denote
with  the common risk-tolerance coecient) and maximizes the expected utility of his short
term prot in = (pn+1 pn)xin, n = 1;2 (we set p0 =  v and p3 = v).12 The short term horizons
of investors can be justied on grounds of incentive reasons related to performance evaluation,
or because of diculties associated with nancing long-term investment in the presence of
capital market imperfections (see Holmstr om and Ricart i Costa (1986), and Shleifer and Vishny
(1990)). An investor i who enters the market in period 1 receives a signal si = v + i which he
recalls in the second period, where i  N(0; 1
 ), v and i are independent for all i.13 We make
the convention that, given v, the average signal
R 1
0 sidi equals v almost surely (i.e., errors cancel
out in the aggregate
R 1
0 idi = 0). We also assume that informed investors observe equilibrium
prices and submit a linear demand schedule (generalized limit order): X1(si;p1) = a2si '1(p1),
and X2(si;p1;p2) = a2si   '2(p1;p2), indicating the desired position in the risky asset for each
realization of the equilibrium price. The constant an denotes the private signal responsiveness,
while 'n() is a linear function of the equilibrium prices.14
The position of liquidity traders is assumed to follow an AR(1) process:
1 = u1
2 = 1 + u2;
(5)
where  2 [0;1] and fu1;u2g is an i.i.d. normally distributed random process (independent of all
other random variables in the model) with un  N(0; 1
u ). If  = 1, fng2
n=1 follows a random
walk and we are in the usual case of independent liquidity trade increments: u2 = 2   1 is
independent from u1 (e.g., Kyle (1985), Vives (1995)). If  = 0, then liquidity trading is i.i.d.
across periods (this is the case considered by Allen et al. (2006)).15
increase.
12We assume, without loss of generality, that the non-random endowment of investors is zero.
13The model can be extended to the case in which investors receive a new private signal in the second period.
However, this complicates the analysis without substantially changing its qualitative results.
14The equilibria in linear strategies of this model are symmetric.
15See Chordia and Subrahmanyam (2004), Easley et al. (2008), and Hendershott and Seasholes (2009) for
empirical evidence on liquidity traders' demand predictability.
8We denote by pn = fptgn
t=1, and by Ein[Y ] = E[Y jsi;pn], En[Y ] = E[Y jpn], Varin[Y ] =
Var[Y jsi;pn], and Varn[Y ] = Var[Y jpn], respectively the expectation and variance of the random
variable Y formed by a trader conditioning on the private and public information he has at
time n, and that obtained conditioning on public information only. The variables n and in
denote instead the precisions of the investors' forecasts of v based only on public and on public
and private information: n = (1=Varn[v]), and in = (1=Varin[v]).
The consensus opinion about the fundamentals at time n is denoted by  En[v] 
R 1
0 Ein[v]di.
Letting En = =in, we have Ein[v] = Ensin + (1   En)En[v], and due to our convention
 En[v] = Env + (1   En)En[v].
2.1 Equilibrium analysis
We start by giving a general description of the equilibrium. The following proposition charac-
terises equilibrium prices:







+ (1   Pn)En[v]; (6)
where n = un +n 1, and an, Pn denote the responsiveness to private information displayed
by investors and by the price at time n. We have that P2 = E2 < 1.
According to (6), at period n the equilibrium price is a weighted average of the market
expectation about the fundamentals v, and the (noisy) average private information held by
investors. Rearranging this expression yields
pn   En[v] =
Pn
an
(an (v   En[v]) + n) (7)
= nEn[n];
where n  Pn=an, implying that there is a discrepancy between pn and En[v] which, as
in (3), captures a premium which is proportional to the expected stock of liquidity trading that
investors accommodate at n:
Corollary 1. At a linear equilibrium, the price incorporates a premium above the semi-strong
ecient price:
pn = En[v] + nEn[n]; (8)





Comparing (9) with (4), shows that short term trading aects the inventory component
of liquidity. In a static market when investors absorb the demand of liquidity traders, they
9are exposed to the risk coming from the randomness of v. In a dynamic market, short term
investors at date 1 face instead the risk due to the randomness of the following period price
(at which they unwind). As liquidity trading displays persistence, second period informed
investors absorb part of rst period liquidity traders' position and this contributes to rst
period investors' uncertainty over p2, yielding (9).
As in the static benchmark, besides the impact of the inventory component n, with dier-
ential information the price impact also reects an asymmetric information component as the
following corollary shows:
Corollary 2. Let a2 = a2   a1 and a1 = a1. At a linear equilibrium, the price impact of




= n + (1   Pn)
anu
n
;n = 1;2: (10)





Dierently from the static benchmark, in a dynamic market this eect depends on the -
weighted net position of informed investors yielding trading intensity a2 = a2  a1. Indeed,
at equilibrium:
x1 + 1 = 0; and x2 + 1 + u2 = 0 ) x2   x1 + u2 = 0:
As a result, the impact of private information depends on the change in informed investors'
position as measured by a2 = a2   a1. When a2 > a1, the eect of private information
impounded in the price by second period investors prevails over that coming from rst period
investors. In this case, asymmetric information generates adverse selection in the second period,
and augments the price impact of trades. This is always the case when  = 0 in which case
the position of rst period informed investors does not matter. However, when a2 < a1,
the opposite occurs and the eect of the information impounded in the price by rst period
investors prevails, yielding favorable selection. In this case, asymmetric information reduces
the price impact of trades. We will see that in equilibrium both possibilities may arise.
In the rst period investors use their private signal on the fundamentals to anticipate the
second period price, insofar as the latter is related to v. However, as argued above, due to
liquidity trading persistence when  > 0, p2 also reects the demand of rst period liquidity
traders. This leads investors to use their private information also to infer 1 from the order

















Ei1[v] + (1   P2)
1
2
E1[v] + 2Ei1[1]: (12)
According to the above expression, when  > 0 the private signal serves two purposes: it allows
to predict the impact of fundamentals on p2 and it creates a private learning channel from the
rst period price (as in Amador and Weill (2010) and Manzano and Vives (2011)) that allows
investors to recover information on 1 from the observation of p1 to predict the impact of 2 on
p2.
It is worth noting that the individual assessment of 1, Ei1[1] = a1 (v   Ei1[v]) + 1, is
decreasing in Ei1[v]. For a given p1 a higher assessment of the fundamentals Ei1[v] goes together
with a lower assessment of liquidity trading Ei1[1]. The consequence of this fact is that an
increase in  will push towards a lower response to private information (Ei1[v]) to forecast p2
since from (12) the weight to Ei1[v] in Ei1[p2] is






The rst part of the weight corresponds to the usual response to private information because
of market making (P2) and because of speculation on fundamentals ((1   P2)(a2)2u=2).
The second part (2) corresponds to the private learning channel from prices which detracts
from the weight to private information, the more so when  grows.
The dual role of private information yields multiple equilibria.
Proposition 2. Linear equilibria always exist. In equilibrium, a2 = , and a1 is implicitly
dened by the equation (a1)  a1(1 + ua2)   a2a2u = 0. If  2 (0;1]:
1. There are two equilibria a
1, a
1 , where a
1 < a
1 (see (A.17), and (A.18), in the appendix
for explicit expressions).
2. We have that a2   a
1 > 0, and 

2 > 0, while a2   a
1 < 0, and 

2 < 0. Furthermore,
j

2 j < 















In the rst period informed investors use their private signal to anticipate the impact of
fundamentals and, when  > 0, that of rst period liquidity trading on the second period price,
at which they unwind. The more p2 reects 1, the less their private signal is useful to predict
11the liquidation price, and the lower is a1. This, in turn, makes the rst period price reect
more liquidity trading, and less private information. As a result the eect of private information
impounded in the price by second period investors prevails over that coming from rst period
investors, a2 > a
1, and 

2 > 0. Hence, adverse selection magnies the second period price
impact of trades and augments rst period investors' uncertainty over the liquidation price,
further lowering their response to private information. In this equilibrium, a
1 is low, and the
second period market is thin with 

2 > 0. Conversely, the more p2 reects v, the more investors'
private signal is useful to predict the liquidation price, and the larger is a1. This makes the
rst period price reect less liquidity trading, and more private information. As a result, the
eect of private information impounded in the price by rst period investors prevails over that
coming from second period investors, a2 < a
1 , and 

2 < 0. In this case, favorable selection
enhances second period liquidity, which lowers investors' uncertainty over the liquidation price,
and further boosts their reaction to private information.
When  = 0, liquidity trading is transient, and rst period investors cannot use their
information to forecast its impact on p2. This eliminates the private learning channel from the
rst period price and yields a unique equilibrium.16
The next result characterizes investors' strategies:











(Ei2[v]   p2): (16)
When  2 (0;1] and (i) a1 = a
1, P1 < E1, and when (ii) a1 = a
1 , P1 > E1. For  = 0,
P1 < E1.
According to (16), in the second period an investor acts like in a static market. In the rst
period, instead, he loads his position anticipating the second period price, and scaling it down





In this case, his strategy can be expressed as the sum of two components (see (15)). The rst
component captures the investor's activity based on his private estimation of the dierence
between the fundamentals and the equilibrium price. This may be seen as akin to \long-term"
speculative trading, aimed at taking advantage of the investor's superior information on the
liquidation value of the asset, since p2 is correlated with v. The second component captures the
investor's activity based on the extraction of order ow, i.e. public, information. This trading
is instead aimed at timing the market by exploiting short-run movements in the asset price
determined by the evolution of the future aggregate demand. Indeed, using the expressions in
16As we show in the proof of the proposition, lim!0 a
1 = +1.
12Corollaries 1, 2:




and due to Proposition 2, the sign of this expression depends on the equilibrium that arises.
In particular, along the equilibrium with high (low) liquidity, 2 < (>)0, implying that based
on public information the investor expects that returns display momentum (reversal). As a
consequence, when observing
E1[1] = a1(v   E1[v]) + 1 > 0;
the investor infers that this realization is more driven by fundamentals information (liquid-
ity trading) and goes long (short) in the asset, \chasing the trend" (\making" the market),
anticipating that second period investors will bid the price up (down) when he unwinds his
position.
As the persistence in liquidity trading () increases, in both equilibria rst period informed
investors speculate less aggressively on their private information. This is so since the impor-
tance of the private learning channel from prices, which detracts from the weight to private
information, grows with .
Corollary 4. At equilibrium for all  2 (0;1), @a1=@ < 0.
Proof. The equation that yields the rst period responsiveness to private information is given
by:
(a1)  2i2a1   a2u = 0:






(1 + ua2) + u(a2   a1)
< 0;
independently of the equilibrium that arises; in the low liquidity equilibrium we have a1 <
a1 < a2  , and in the high liquidity equilibrium a1 > a2= > a2 and 1 + ua2 < 0. 2
We conclude this section, showing that absent private information, equilibrium multiplicity
disappears when  > 0. In this case prices are invertible in the demand of liquidity traders,
and the model is akin to Grossman and Miller (1988):
Corollary 5. When  = 0, for all  2 [0;1] there exists a unique equilibrium where
pn =  v + nn (19)
Xn(pn) =  
 1
n (pn    v); (20)





13According to (20), informed investors always take the other side of the order ow, buying the
asset at a discount when n < 0, and selling it at a premium otherwise. For a given realization
of the innovation in liquidity traders' demand un, the larger is n, the larger is the adjustment
in the price investors require in order to absorb it. Therefore, n proxies for the liquidity of
the market. Uniqueness follows from the absence of private information. Indeed, in this case
prices are invertible in the demand of liquidity traders and the feedback loop responsible for
equilibrium multiplicity disappears.
2.2 Stability
In this section we analyze the stability of the equilibrium solutions. We start by dening the
best response function which determines the equilibrium responsiveness to private information
of a rst period investor, given the average responsiveness of his peers.
Owing to CARA and normality, an investor in the rst period trades according to (17). In
the proof of Proposition 1, we use (17) to show that an investor's best response obtains as the
ratio between the risk-adjusted weight to private information in the investor's private forecast
Ei1[p2], and the investor's uncertainty over the liquidation price Vari1[p2]:17




Inspection of (21) yields that for a1 = ^ a1  
 1(a2 + (u) 1) 2 (a
1;a
1 ), the best response
is discontinuous: lima1!^ a 
1  (a1) =  1; and lima1!^ a+
1  (a1) = +1. Indeed, in this case an
individual investor in period 1 would like to take an unbounded position since the favorable
selection eect exactly osets the inventory risk eect, implying that he does not face any price
risk. This discontinuity implies that the best response has two branches and two equilibria





(1 + a2u)2 < 0; (22)
for all  > 0 and both branches. The decisions on the weight assigned to private information
in the rst period are strategic substitutes. This is the outcome of the interaction of the usual
Grossman-Stiglitz type forces for strategic susbtitutability in the use of information together
with the inuence of the private learning channel from prices.
To analyze stability, consider the following argument. Assume that the market is at an
equilibrium point  a1, so that  a1 =  ( a1). Suppose now that a small perturbation to  a1 occurs.
As a consequence, rst period investors modify their weights to private information so that the
aggregate weight becomes  a0
1 =  ( a0
1). If the market goes back to the original  a1 according to












Figure 1: Equilibrium determination and stability. The gure displays the best reply function
 (a1) (solid line) and the 45-degree line a1 (dotted line). Equilibria obtain at the points where
the two intersect. The vertical line (drawn at the point ^ a1 = 4) shows the value of a1 for which
the best reply mapping is discontinuous. Parameters' values are as follows: v = u =  =
 = 1, and  = :5. For these values the equilibria are a
1 = 0:438 and a
1 = 4:561. Inspection
of the equilibria shows that j 
0(a
1)j < 1, while j 
0(a
1 )j > 1.
Otherwise it is unstable. Formally, we have the following denition:
Denition 1 (Stability). An equilibrium is stable (unstable) if and only if its corresponding
value for a1 is a stable (unstable) xed point for the best response function  () (i.e., if and
only if its corresponding value for a1 satises j 
0(a1) < 1j).
With this denition we obtain the following.









The above result implies that the equilibrium with high responsiveness to private informa-
tion and high liquidity is unstable according to the best reply dynamics (see Figure 1) while
the low responsiveness one is stable. Strategic substitutability is much stronger in the second
branch of the best response, leading to instability (see appendix B for an explanation of the
degree of strategic substitutability in terms of the decomposition of the traditional and private
learning channel eects on the best response along the lines of (13)).
3 The eect of residual uncertainty
In this section we perform a robustness exercise and assume that investors face residual un-
certainty over the nal liquidation value. Therefore, we model the nal payo as ^ v = v + ,
where   N(0;
 1
 ) is a random term orthogonal to all the random variables in the market,
15and about which no investor is informed. The addition of the random term  allows to study
the eect of an increase in the residual uncertainty that surrounds investors' environment in
periods of heightened turbulence, and shows that a price crash can occur within our framework.
With residual uncertainty, the expressions for prices and investors' strategies do not change
(that is, expressions (8), (15), and (16) hold). However, the equilibrium obtains as the solution
of a system of two cubic equations and is therefore no longer closed form solvable.
Proposition 3. When investors face residual uncertainty over the nal payo, there always
exists a linear equilibrium, where a1 and a2 obtain as a solution to the following system of cubic
equations:
2(a1;a2)  a2(1 + )    = 0 (24)
1(a1;a2)  a1(1 +  + a2u)   a2a2u(1 + ) = 0; (25)
where   i2=.
Studying (24) shows that for any a1 there exists a unique real solution to 2() = 0, which
simplies the numerical analysis.18 Let a
2(a1) be the unique real solution to (24), then the rst





1 +  + a2u
: (26)
Numerical analysis of the solution to the above xed point shows that for low values of 1=




1 , and second period liquidity (see Figure 2).
Depending on parameters' values equilibria can be stable or unstable. In Figure 2, panel
(a) we show an example in which both the low and the intermediate liquidity equilibria are




1 survives. Intuitively, a higher residual uncertainty, increases , and lowers
second period investors' response to private signals. Thus, rst period investors anticipate
that the second period price is less related to the fundamentals, which lowers their reliance on
private information. As a consequence, the rst period price reects less v and more 1, further
lowering rst period investors' reliance on private information. Therefore, even though a high




Based on the above results, we now show that an increase in residual uncertainty may yield
a price crash.19 To see this, let's assume that  u < 0, so that informed investors in period 1
18This is immediate, since owing to (24), at equilibrium a2 > 0, which implies that we can restrict attention to
the positive orthant. Then, 2(a1;0) =   < 0, and (@2=@a2) = 3a2
2u  4a1a2u +i1 +(a1)2u +,
which is a quadratic with discriminant  = 4u((a1)2u   3(i1 + )) < 0, and thus is always positive.
Therefore, for any a1, the second period optimal responsiveness to private information is uniquely determined.
19Other authors have investigated price crashes in markets with asymmetric information. See Gennotte and






















Figure 2: Equilibrium determination and stability with residual uncertainty. The gure dis-
plays the best reply function  (a1) (solid line) and the 45-degree line a1 (dotted line). Equilibria
obtain at the points where the two intersect. The vertical lines in panel (a) show the values
of a1 for which the best reply mapping is discontinuous. Parameters' values are as follows:
v = u =  =  = 1,  = :3, 1= = 1=90 in panel (a), and 1= = 1=60 in panel (b). For these
values the equilibria in panel (a) are (a
1;a2(a
1)) = (0:447;0:968), (a
1 ;a2(a
1 )) = (9:928;0:494),
and (a
1 ;a2(a




1)) =  0:088,  
0(a
1 ;a2(a
1 )) =  0:781, and  
0(a
1 ;a2(a
1 )) = 10:789. In
panel (b) we have a unique equilibrium with (a
1;a2(a





expect to hold a positive amount of the asset. In appendix C we show that this assumption
implies
E[p1]   p1 =  v + 1 u: (27)
Indeed, when  u < 0 rst period investors anticipate absorbing a positive supply of the asset at
equilibrium and thus require a compensation on the price they pay which lowers the expected
price below the unconditional expectation of the payo the more the higher is 1: E[p1] <  v.
Now, assume the same set of parameters of Figure 2, and  v =   u = 1. Start with 1= = 1=90,
so that there are three equilibria, which imply three expected price levels at respectively
 p

1 = 0:3479;  p

1 = 0:9966;  p

1 = 0:9991; (28)
reecting the fact that in the high liquidity equilibrium (the one with three stars) the uncer-
tainty on p2 is very small, and thus the expected price is very high since investors demand a
small compensation to absorb the expected selling pressure from liquidity traders. Conversely,
in the low liquidity equilibrium (one star) the opposite occurs. Now if 1= = 1=60 we know




If we let 1= increase gradually, we obtain Figure 3. According to the gure, for low values
of the residual uncertainty parameter, three equilibria arise with expected prices that rank
from farther away to very close to  v = 1, respectively for the low, intermediate and high
liquidity equilibrium (expected prices in the latter two equilibria are very close to each other,
as testied by the values in (28)). Suppose that investors have coordinated on the equilibrium
with intermediate liquidity and that the market is suddenly shocked by an increase in residual
uncertainty. As a result the equilibrium set becomes a singleton, and the expected price crashes








1=90 1=85 1=80 1=75 1=70 1=65 1=60
1=
 p1
Figure 3: Example of a price crash. For 1= < 1=78, there are three equilibria, which narrow
down to one when 1=  1=78. Parameters' values are as follows:  =  = v = u = 1,
 = :3,  v =   u = 1, and 1= 2 f1=90;1=89;:::;1=60g.
4 HFT
HFT accounts for a rapidly increasing proportion of the trades carried out in today's exchanges
(according to Tabb Group, in 2010 HFT represented roughly two thirds of all equity trades
in the US and slightly more than one third in Europe). High Frequency Traders (HFTs) scan
market data using computer algorithms to detect trading opportunities and rapidly react to
such opportunities to lock-in protable trades (the \latency" between the time at which the
information is obtained by the computer and the time at which the trade is executed at the
exchange is in the order of milliseconds and even microseconds).
The previous sections have established that when liquidity traders' demand is persistent,
short term investors exploit a private learning channel from the rst period price to learn the
18demand of liquidity traders. This generates multiple equilibria with strikingly dierent features.
In this section we interpret our short term, informed investors as HFTs and apply our results
to the analysis of HFT's impact on the market.
Two related reasons make our analysis well suited to capture HFT. The rst one stems from
our joint assumptions that informed investors have a short term horizon and that liquidity
traders' demand displays persistence. Indeed, these two assumptions allow us to model the
possibility that informed investors' holding period is shorter than liquidity traders' one. To see
this, consider the following argument. In the rst period, market clearing implies:
x1 + 1 = 0:
Suppose now that 0 <  < 1, then in the second period market clearing involves (i) the
reverting position of rst period informed investors  x1, (ii) the position of second period
informed investors x2, (iii) a fraction 1  of the rst period liquidity traders' position 1 (who
revert), and (iv) the new generation of liquidity traders with demand u2. Letting x2  x2 x1,
2  2   1 = u2   (1   )1, market clearing implies
x2   x1 + u2   (1   )1 = 0 , x2 + 2 = 0 , x2 + 1 + u2 = 0:
Note that while due to short horizons, the entire position of rst period informed investors
reverts at time 2, assuming persistent liquidity trading implies that only a fraction (1   )1
of rst period liquidity trades reverts (while the complementary fraction is held until the liqui-
dation date). The lower is , the higher is this fraction. Thus, when informed investors have a
short horizon, persistent liquidity trades allow to model in a parsimonious way the possibility
that agents have dierent holding periods: when  = 0 informed investors and liquidity traders
have the same holding period; as  grows, liquidity traders' holding period becomes increas-
ingly longer than that of informed investors (see Table 1). It is precisely this holding period
discrepancy that allows informed investors to exploit the private learning channel, to anticipate
the impact that liquidity traders' future demand has on the price at which they unwind.20
The existence of a private learning channel from prices leads informed investors to use
private signals to infer the evolution of the second period aggregate demand from the rst
period (public) order ow (see Corollary 3). This oers the second reason to interpret our
informed investors as HFTs since our informed investors have a privileged channel to interpret
the order ow and therefore can anticipate it. Along the high liquidity equilibrium, investors
speculate on price continuation, whereas along the low liquidity equilibrium they speculate on
reversal. Thus, the behavior of informed investors in our model runs parallel to the claimed
order anticipation with HFT.21
20In this way we can interpret the case  = 0 as capturing the extreme situation in which the technological
features of HFT are available to all liquidity traders too, whereas when  = 1 the technological gap between
HFT and liquidity trading is maximal.
21Indeed, the strategies described in Corollary 3 are akin to HFT \order anticipation". According to the
January 2010 SEC Concept release, an order anticipation strategy \...involves any means to ascertain the
19Trading Date 1 2
Liquidity traders
Holding   1
New shock u1 u2
Position 1 = u1 2 = 1 + u2




Table 1: The evolution of liquidity trades and informed investors' positions in the two periods.
The position of liquidity traders in every period is given by the sum of \Holding" and \New
shock." Market clearing at n requires that the sum of liquidity traders' and informed investors'
positions oset each other.
Empirically, a number of authors nd that HFT substantially boosts market quality, in par-
ticular enhancing price (informational) eciency, and improving market depth (see, e.g., Hen-
dershott, Jones, and Menkveld (2010), Brogaard (2010), and Hendershott and Riordan (2010)).
At the same time, however, concern has been voiced over the potentially destabilizing role of
HFT (Kirilenko et al. (2010)). Our results in Proposition 2, Corollary 6, and in Section 3
appear to be in line with the above evidence. Indeed, we nd that it is precisely the activity
of using private information to infer the demand of liquidity trading from public information
that, via the private learning channel, can generate an equilibrium with high informational
eciency, and a thick market. However, such equilibrium turns out to be unstable (in the
absence of residual uncertainty, with respect to the best reply dynamics) and even if stable is
likely to disappear when market conditions deteriorate and private information is a poor guide
to investment decisions. Thus, the presence of HFTs leads to equilibrium multiplicity with the
outcome of either instability at a high liquidity equilibrium, or a stable equilibrium with low
liquidity.
Our results also cast a dierent light on order anticipation. Order anticipators are commonly
interpreted as \parasitic traders," who prot from the exploitation of other traders' orders
without contributing to the informational eciency of prices, nor improving market liquidity.22
This seems to be at odds with the above mentioned empirical evidence. Our model claries that
order anticipation can enhance market quality, via the eect of the private learning channel
from prices on investors' use of private information.
existence of a large buyer (seller) that does not involve violation of a duty, misappropriation of information, or
other misconduct. Examples include the employment of sophisticated pattern recognition software to ascertain
from publicly available information the existence of a large buyer (seller)..." (emphasis added). This description
matches the intuition for rst period investors' strategies (see (15)).
22See Harris (2002). Cartea and Penalva (2011) introduce HFT in a symmetric information model of liquidity
provision  a la Grossman-Miller, assuming that these investors have a superior ability to anticipate the evolution
of the future aggregate demand for the asset compared to professional traders. In this context, they show that
HFT has a negative impact on market quality, increasing microstructure noise and magnifying the price impact
of trades.
20Finally, we conclude our analysis of HFT by considering its impact on the expected losses
of liquidity traders. As argued above, with persistence, a fraction  of rst period liquidity
traders hold their position until the event date, while the remaining unwind at date 2. This
implies that rst period liquidity traders' expected prots are given by
1  E[1(v   p1) + (1   )1(p2   p1)]
=  








u < 0: (29)
It is easy to see that along the high liquidity equilibrium lim!0 1 = 0, since in this case the
rst period signal responsiveness diverges at  = 0 (see Proposition 2). On the contrary, along
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Figure 4: Expected prot along the low liquidity equilibrium (dotted line) and along the high
liquidity equilibrium (continuous line) as a function of . Other parameter values are v = 10,
u = 1,  = 1,  = 1.
Depending on parameter values the two plots intersect or not, but the bottomline is that for
 small, liquidity traders' expected losses are always smaller along the high liquidity equilibrium.
This is again in line with the view that the introduction of algorithmic trading and HFT have
generated a large improvement in market liquidity accompanied by a reduction in adverse
selection risk (see, e.g. Hendershott, Jones, and Menkveld (2010)). Indeed, in the high liquidity
equilibrium, rst period investors response to private information is strong, and in fact it
generates favorable selection in the second period (see Proposition 2). However, as already
argued above, in our framework this result is a weak one, as the equilibrium with high liquidity
is unstable. Furthermore, looking again at the gure, we see that in both equilibria a higher
21technological advantage of HFT (higher ) increases the expected losses of rst period liquidity
traders.
5 Average expectations and reliance on public informa-
tion
In this section we use our model to investigate the claim that when investors have a short
horizon, prices reect the latter HOEs about fundamentals and are farther away from the nal
payo compared to average expectations (Allen, Morris, and Shin (2006)). We show here that
as with liquidity trading persistence investors use their private information also to infer the
demand of liquidity traders from the rst period order ow, the rst period price is driven by
investors' HOEs about fundamentals and by their average expectations about liquidity trading.
This, in turn, has implications for price reliance on public information.
Starting from the second period, and imposing market clearing yields
Z 1
0
X2(si;p1;p2)di + 2 = 0: (30)





Replacing the above in (30) and solving for the equilibrium price we obtain
p2 =  E2[v] + 22:
Similarly, in the rst period, imposing market clearing yields:
Z 1
0
X1(si;p1)di + 1 = 0;
and solving for the equilibrium price we obtain




Substituting the above obtained expression for p2 in (31) yields
p1 =  E1













According to (32), there are three terms that form the second period price: investors' second
order average expectations over the liquidation value (  E1[  E2[v]]), the risk-adjusted impact of the
22rst period stock of liquidity trades (1), and investors' average expectations over rst period
liquidity trades (  E1[1]). The latter arises since p2 depends on 2; which in turn is correlated
with 1 when  > 0. Thus, investors in period 1 are interested in estimating 1:
Expression (32) implies that due to persistence in liquidity trading, the weight placed by
the price on investors' average information is the sum of two terms: the rst term captures the





=  E1v + (1    E1)E1[v]
 E1[1] = a1(1   E1)(v   E1[v]) + 1;
where








Given (32), this implies that the total weight the price places on average private information
is given by
P1 =  E1 + 2a1(1   E1):
Note that 8,  E1 < E1. Thus, when liquidity trading is transient ( = 0) the rst period price
places a larger weight on public information than the optimal statistical weight. This nding
is in line with Morris and Shin (2002), and Allen, Morris, and Shin (2006). The latter prove
that with heterogeneous information, prices reect investors' HOEs about the nal payo. In
this case, the law of iterated expectations does not hold, and investors' forecasts overweight
public information because these anticipate the average market opinion knowing that this also
depends on the public information observed by other investors. The price is then systematically
farther away from fundamentals compared to investors' consensus.
However, when liquidity trading is persistent, the price also reects investors' average ex-
pectations about the impact that the demand of rst period liquidity traders has on the second





can increase the weight placed on average private information above the optimal statistical
weight. Due to Corollary 3 we then have
Corollary 7. At equilibrium,






1; then P1 < E1; and Cov[p1;v] < Cov[  E1[v];v]
a
1 ; then P1 > E1; and Cov[p1;v] > Cov[  E1[v];v]:
2. When  = 0, P1 < E1 and Cov[p1;v] < Cov[  E1[v];v].
23With persistence liquidity traders' positions in the rst and second period are positively
correlated. Thus, investors use their private signals also to infer the demand of liquidity traders
from the order ow (the private learning channel), anticipating the impact this has on the next
period price. As private signals are informative about the fundamentals, this increases the
weight the rst period price assigns to the average private information. Along the equilibrium
with high liquidity, investors escalate their response to private information. In this case the
extra weight that adds to  E1 is high enough to draw the price closer to fundamentals compared
to consensus. In view of the results obtained in Section 2.2 this equilibrium is, however,
unstable. Along the equilibrium with low liquidity the price is farther away from fundamentals
compared to consensus. This equilibrium, which shares the same properties of the one found
by Allen, Morris, and Shin (2006), is instead stable.
6 Asset pricing implications
In this section we investigate the implications of our analysis for the asset pricing literature. In
particular, we show that liquidity trading persistence can generate positive autocovariance of
returns, without the need to impose heterogenous beliefs (as in Banerjee, Kaniel, and Kremer
(2009)) or to assume that investors' preferences display a behavioral bias (as in, e.g., Daniel,
Hirshleifer, and Subrahmanyam (1998)). We then look at the expected volume of informational
trading and, consistently with the evidence presented in Llorente, Michaely, Saar, and Wang
(2002), we nd that in our setup a high volume of informational trading predicts momentum.
As we argue below, these results are consistent with a large body of evidence that points at
the existence of patterns in the autocorrelation of returns. Typically these studies encompass
slower trading frequencies than those adopted by HFT. However, as argued by Khandani and
Lo (2011), strategies that exploit such patterns can be implemented at dierent frequencies,
including the very high ones that characterize HFT.
6.1 Momentum and reversal
We start by computing the return autocovariance at dierent horizons:
Corollary 8 (Autocovariance of returns). At equilibrium:
1. For all  2 [0;1], Cov[p2   p1;p1    v] < 0.
2. For  2 (0;1], Cov[v   p2;p1    v] < 0. For  = 0, Cov[v   p2;p1    v] = 0.
3. For  2 (0;1], along the equilibrium with high liquidity Cov[v   p2;p2   p1] > 0. Along
the equilibrium with low liquidity, for v < ^ v, there exists a value ^  such that for all
 > ^ , Cov[v   p2;p2   p1] > 0 (the expression for ^ v is given in the appendix, see
equation (A.36)). If  = 0, Cov[v   p2;p2   p1] < 0.
24According to the above result, along the equilibrium with high liquidity, momentum occurs
at short horizons (close to the end of the trading horizon), whereas at a longer horizon, returns
display reversal.23 This is in line with the empirical ndings on return anomalies that document
the existence of positive return autocorrelation at short horizons (ranging from six to twelve
months, see Jegadeesh and Titman (1993)), and negative autocorrelation at long horizons (from
three to ve years, see De Bondt and Thaler (1985)).
The rst two results derive from the fact that a given estimated rst period imbalance,
E1[1], has an opposite eect on p1    v, and p2  p1, v  p2.24 For the third result, a covariance
decomposition (and the normality of returns) yields:











implying that the short-term interim returns' autocovariance can be decomposed in two terms.
The rst term captures the returns' covariation due to the fact that both E1[v   p2] and
E1[p2   p1] vary with p1. The second term captures the returns' covariation due to the fact
that for each p1 both second and third period returns jointly vary around their corresponding
conditional expectations. All else equal, with persistence the anticipated impact of the rst
period imbalance has the same sign on both the second and third period expected returns, so
that the rst term is always positive when  > 0.25
For the second term, factoring out the impact of rst period information, the joint co-
variation of returns around their expectations could be driven either by liquidity trading or by
fundamentals information. In the high liquidity equilibrium, as prices are close to fundamentals,
the second eect predominates and returns positively covary around their means. Conversely,
in the low liquidity equilibrium, prices are more driven by liquidity trades, so that returns tend
to covary around their means in opposite directions.
Equation (33) shows that optimal investment behavior in our model departs in a substantial
way from the one of an outside observer that relies on the sign of the unconditional return
covariance to trade. Indeed, an investor in our model engages in momentum trading only for
a stock that displays a very strong positive autocovariance. Equivalently, he may adopt a
contrarian strategy even when an outside observer would see Cov[v   p2;p2   p1] > 0. This is
because, as argued in Corollary 3, informed investors base their decision to chase the trend or
act as contrarians on the sign of Cov1[v   p2;p2   p1].
It is interesting to relate our result on momentum with Daniel, Hirshleifer, and Subrah-
manyam (1998) who assume that overcondent investors underestimate the dispersion of the
23Numerical simulations show that in a model with three periods, in the equilibrium with high liquidity, both
Cov[v   p3;p3   p2] and Cov[p3   p2;p2   p1] are positive.
24As one can verify Cov[v   p2;p1    v] = Cov[E1[v   p2];E1[p1    v]] =  2Cov[E1[1];p1] < 0, and
Cov[p2   p1;p1    v] = Cov[E1[p2   p1];E1[p1    v] = (2   1)Cov[E1[1];p1] < 0.
25If p1 decreases compared to p2, both p2   p1 and v   p2 are expected to increase, given that the selling
pressure could come from liquidity traders which have a persistent supply. Thus, liquidity trades persistence
osets the mean reversion eect due to rst period short-term investors' unwinding at date 2.
25error term aecting their signals and \overreact" to private information. This, in turn, gen-
erates long term reversal and, in the presence of conrming public information which due to
biased self attribution boosts investors' condence, also lead to short term positive return auto-
correlation. This pattern of overreaction, continuation, and correction is likely to aect stocks
which are more dicult to value (e.g., growth stocks). In such a context, momentum is thus
a symptom of mispricing and hence related to prices wandering away from fundamentals (con-
versely, reversal is identied with price corrections). In our model, along the equilibrium with
high liquidity, investors rationally react more strongly to their private signals compared to the
static benchmark, in contrast to the overreaction eect of the behavioral literature.26 However,
this heavy reaction to private information leads to stronger information impounding and to
prices that track better the fundamentals (see Proposition 2). Momentum at short horizons in
this case is therefore associated with a rapid convergence of the price to the full information
value. To illustrate this fact, in Figure 5 we plot the mean price paths along the equilibrium
with low liquidity (thick line), with high liquidity (thin line), and along the \static" equilibrium,
that is the one that would obtain if investors reacted to information as if they were in a static
market (dotted line). From the plot it is apparent that in the equilibrium with high liquidity
the price displays a faster adjustment to the full information value than in the equilibrium with
low liquidity (and the static equilibrium). This shows that the occurrence of momentum is not











Figure 5: Mean price paths along the equilibrium with low liquidity (thick line), high liquidity
(thin line), and assuming that rst period investors react to private information as if they were in
a static market (i.e., setting a1 = ). Parameters' values are as follows: v =  = u =  = 1,
 v = 1,  = :9 and v 2 f1:5;:5g.
As stated in the corollary, momentum can also occur along the equilibrium with low liquid-
26Indeed, the static solution calls for a1 =  (see, e.g, Admati (1985), or Vives (2008)), and it is easy
to verify that 0 < a
1 <  < a
1 . In Daniel, Hirshleifer, and Subrahmanyam (1998) overcondent investors
overweight private information in relation to the prior.
26ity, provided that investors are suciently uncertain about the liquidation value prior to trading
(that is, v is low) and that liquidity trading is suciently persistent ( high). In that equilib-
rium, investors respond less to private information, information impounding is staggered, and
prices adjust more slowly to the full information value (see Figure 5). However, if suciently
persistent, liquidity trading exerts a continuous price pressure which can eventually outweigh
the former eect. Therefore, along this equilibrium momentum arises with slow convergence to
the full information value, implying that the occurrence of a positive autocorrelation at short
horizons per se does not allow to unconditionally identify the informational properties of prices.
Finally, at long horizons, the eect of private information on the correlation of returns
washes out and the only driver of the autocovariance is the persistence in liquidity trading,
which generates reversal.
6.2 Expected volume and return predictability
We now turn our attention to the implications of our results for the expected volume of infor-
mational trading and the predictability of returns along the two equilibria. We show that the
expected volume of informational trading is high (low) along the high (low) liquidity equilib-
rium. This implies that a high volume of informational trading predicts momentum, in line
with the evidence presented by Llorente, Michaely, Saar, and Wang (2002). However, as we
have argued in the previous section, also along the equilibrium with low liquidity momentum
can occur, provided liquidity trading displays suciently strong persistence (and the ex-ante
uncertainty about the liquidation value is suciently high). This implies that a low volume
of informational trading can also predict continuation. In this case, though, momentum is a
signal of slow price convergence to the liquidation value. In sum, momentum is compatible
with both a high and a low volume of informational trading, but the implications that return
continuation has for price informativeness are markedly dierent in the two situations.
We start by dening the volume of informational trading as the expected traded volume
in the market with heterogeneous information net of the expected volume that obtains in the
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We measure the total volume of informational trading with V1 + V2, and obtain
Corollary 9 (Expected volume of informational trading). At equilibrium, for all  2 (0;1] the
expected volume of informational trading is higher along the high liquidity equilibrium. When
 = 0 only the equilibrium with a low volume of informational trading survives.
Proof. Rearranging the expressions for investors' strategies obtained in Corollary 3 yields
xin = anin   n, for n = 1;2. Owing to the fact that for a normally distributed random






which implies (see (34), and (35)), that V1+V2 is an increasing function of a1. Recall that while
a2 = , in the rst period the response to private information is higher along the equilibrium
with high liquidity: a
1 > a









The intuition for the above result is straightforward: as along the equilibrium with high
liquidity investors step up the response to their signals, the position change due to private
information is higher along such equilibrium.
Taking together Corollaries 33 and 9 imply that a high volume of informational trading
in the second period predicts return continuation, no matter what the persistence in liquidity
trading is. A low volume of informational trading, on the other hand, can also be associated
with momentum, provided liquidity trading is suciently persistent.
7 Conclusions
When liquidity traders' positions are positively correlated across trading dates, investors exploit
a private learning channel to infer the demand of liquidity traders from the price at which they
load their positions, and anticipate the price at which they unwind them. We show that this
eect generates multiple equilibria which can be ranked in terms of investors' responsiveness
to private information, liquidity, and informational eciency.
28In our framework short term investors can be seen as HFTs that, due to the predictability of
liquidity traders' demand implied by persistence, engage in order anticipation. This provides an
economic rationale to the positive impact of HFT on market quality that is widely documented
in the empirical literature. Indeed, we show that HFT can induce an equilibrium with high
informational eciency and liquidity. However, this equilibrium is unstable (in the absence
of residual uncertainty, with respect to the best reply dynamics), and even if stable is likely
to disappear when market conditions deteriorate and private information is a poor guide to
investment decisions. Thus, even though HFT can have a positive impact on market quality,
the benets it creates are likely to be eeting.
Our analysis also allows to clarify the role of HOEs in asset pricing. As with liquidity trading
persistence investors use their private information also to infer the demand of liquidity traders
from the order ow, we show that prices are driven by average expectations about fundamentals
and liquidity trading. Along the equilibrium with low liquidity, prices are driven by average
expectations about fundamentals, and therefore over-rely on public information (compared to
the optimal statistical weight). Conversely, along the equilibrium with high liquidity, the price
is driven by average expectations about liquidity trading, investors step up their response to
private signals, and prices under-rely on public information (compared to the optimal statistical
weight).
Our paper provides an alternative interpretation for empirically documented regularities
on the patterns of return autocorrelation. As we have argued, at long horizons returns display
reversal. However, return correlation at short horizons depends on the equilibrium that prevails
in the market. In the equilibrium with high liquidity, investors escalate their response to private
information and momentum arises. Conversely, in the low liquidity equilibrium investors scale
down their response to private signals and, when liquidity trading is not very persistent, returns
tend to revert. While this oers an explanation for returns' predictability which departs from
behavioral assumptions, our analysis also makes the empirical prediction that both a high or a
low volume of informational trading can predict momentum. In the former case, this is a signal
that prices rely poorly on public information and accurately reect fundamentals starting from
the earlier stages of the trading process. In this case momentum at short horizons proxies for a
rapid price convergence to the full information value. In the latter case, instead, prices heavily
rely on public information and oer a poor signal of fundamentals. In this case, therefore,
momentum proxies for a continuing, liquidity-driven, price pressure.
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32A Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1
Consider a candidate linear (symmetric) equilibrium and let z1  a1v+1 be the \informational
content" of the rst period order ow and simlarly z2  a2v + u2 where a2  a2   a1 for
the second period. Then, it is easy to see that p1 is observationally equivalent (o.e.) to z1
and that the sequence fz1;z2g is o.e. to fp1;p2g. Consider a candidate linear (symmetric)
equilibrium xi1 = a1si '1(p1), xi2 = a2si '2(p1;p2), where 'n() is a linear function. Letting
xn 
R 1
0 xindi, and imposing market clearing in the rst period implies (due to our convention):
x1 + 1 = 0 , a1v + 1 = '1(p1): (A.1)
In the second period the market clearing condition is
x2 + 1 + u2 = 0 , x2   x1 + u2 = 0
, a2v   '2(p1;p2)   (a1v   '1(p1)) + u2 = 0
, a2v + u2 = '2(p1;p2)   '1(p1); (A.2)
where in the second line we use (A.1). From (A.1) and (A.2) it is easy to see that z1 is o.e. to
p1 and that fz1;z2g is o.e. to fp1;p2g. It thus follows that En[v] =  1
n (v + u
Pn
t=1 atzt),
Varn[v] = (v + u
Pn
t=1(at)2) 1, Ein[v] = 
 1




To prove our argument, we proceed by backwards induction. In the last trading period
















+ (1   P2)E2[v]; (A.4)











+ (1   P2)
a2u




Az2 + (1   2a2)^ p1; (A.5)
where ^ p1  (1 + a1) 1(1E1[v] + z1), which provides an alternative expression for p2
33which separates the impact on second period \news" from the information contained in the
rst period order ow.
























(^ p1   p1):
















a1 obtains as a xed point of the mapping







and   a1=(). Finally, note that using (A.10) and (A.11) and rearranging the expression











Proof of Corollary 1
In the second period, rearranging (A.4), p2 = E2[v] + 2E2[2], where 2 = Vari2[v]=. In the
34rst period due to short term horizons, we have













































+ (1   P1)E1[v]: (A.13)












Proof of Corollary 2
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Proof of Proposition 2
For any  2 [0;1], in the second period an equilibrium must satisfy a2 = . In the rst
35period, using (A.11), an equilibrium must satisfy
1(a1;a2)  a12(2 + )   a2u
= a1(1 + ua2)   
2a2u = 0: (A.16)
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ua2(1 + 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p






1 + ua2(1 + ) +
p





1. This proves that for  > 0 there are two linear equilibria.
Inspection of the above expressions for a1 shows that a
1 < a2, while a
1 > a2. This implies
that  > 1 for a1 = a




1 ;a2) > E1(a
1 ;a2). The result for second period illiquidity follows from
substituting (A.17) and (A.18) in 2. To see that prices are more informative along the low
illiquidity equilibrium note that in the rst period Var[vjz1] 1 = 1 = v +a2
1u. In the second
period, the price along the low illiquidity equilibrium is more informative than along the high
illiquidity equilibrium if and only if
(1 + 
2 + a2u((1   
2) + (1 + 
2)))
p




which is always true.
When  ! 0, along the high liquidity equilibrium we have
lim
!0
1 + u(a2 + ) +
p
1 + u(2(a2 + ) + u(a2   )2)
2u
= 1;
while along the low liquidity equilibrium, using l'Hospital's rule,
lim
!0
1 + u(a2 + )  
p




























1 ;a2) = 0. 2
36Proof of Corollary 3
See the proof of Proposition 1.
2
Proof of Corollary 5
Assume that in a linear equilibrium xn =  n(pn), with n() a linear function of pn. This
implies that the market clearing equation at time n reads as follows:
xn + n = 0 ,  n(pn) + n = 0:
Hence, at equilibrium pn is observationally equivalent to n, i.e. at time n investors know the
realisation of the noise stock n. To solve for the equilibrium we proceed by backward induction














p2 =  v + 22: (A.21)


















p1 =  v + 11: (A.24)
2
37Proof of Corollary 6
Starting from the low liquidity equilibrium, we need to verify that j 
0(a
1)j < 1, or that when
a1 = a
1,
a2u < (1 + ua2)
2:




1)j < 1 ,  2(1+a2u(1 ))(1+a2u(1 )+
p
(1 + ua2(1 + ))2   4(ua2)2) < 0;
which is always satised. For the high liquidity equilibrium, we need instead to verify that
j 
0(a
1 )j > 1, or that when a1 = a
1 ,
a2u > (1 + ua2)
2:




1 )j > 1 , 2(1+a2u(1 ))( (1+a2u(1 ))+
p
(1 + ua2(1 + ))2   4(ua2)2) > 0;
which is always satised, since the rst factor in the product on the R.H.S. of the above
expression is positive, while manipulating the second factor shows that
p
(1 + ua2(1 + ))2   4(ua2)2 > (1 + a2u(1   )) , 4a2u > 0:
2
Proof of Proposition 3











p2 = 2z2 + (1   2a2)^ p1;
where
2 =




1E1[v] + (1 + )z1
1 + a1(1 + )
; (A.28)





where Ei1[p2] = 2a2Ei1[v] + (1   2a2)^ p1, and Vari1[p2] = 
2
2Vari1[z2]. Identifying the rst




1 +  + a2u(1   (1 + ))
: (A.29)
The equilibrium obtains as a solution to the system (A.26)-(A.29) which corresponds to (24)-
(25). 2
Proof of Corollary 7





























We can now subtract (A.31) from (A.30) and obtain
Cov







implying that the price at time 1 over relies on public information (compared to the optimal
statistical weight) if and only if the covariance between the price and the fundamentals falls
short of that between the consensus opinion and the fundamentals. 2
Proof of Corollary 33
To compute Cov[p2   p1;p1    v] we rearrange expression (6) in the paper to obtain
p2   p1 = 2u2 + 2a2
















Next, using expression (8) we obtain
Cov[p2   p1;p1    v] =  
12a2
a1ui1
< 0;8 2 (0;1]:
39Computing the limit for  ! 0 of the above expression yields dierent results depending on
whether we concentrate on the high or low liquidity equilibrium. Indeed,
lim
!0








Cov[p2   p1;p1    v]ja1=a
1 = 0:
To compute the expression for Cov[v   p2;p1    v] we use (A.34) and (8), and obtain
Cov[v   p2;p1    v] =  
1
i2u
< 0 for all  > 0.
In this case the taking the limit of the above covariance for  ! 0 yields the same result across
the two equilibria that arise:
lim
!0
Cov[v   p2;p1    v]ja1=a
1 = lim
!0
Cov[v   p2;p1    v]ja1=a
1 = 0:
To compute Cov[v   p2;p2   p1] we use (A.33) and using again expression (8) we get














Using (A.33) and (A.34) we can now compute the autocovariance of returns and get






















Looking at (A.35) we can immediately say that along the equilibrium with high liquidity there
is momentum. This is true because in that equilibrium 2 < 0 and a2 < 0. Along the
equilibrium with low liquidity momentum can occur, depending on the persistence of liquidity






which can be rearranged as an (implicit) condition on the magnitude of :
a1i1
a2(i1   v)
<  < 1:
If  = 0, the above condition is never satised. Indeed, in this case there exists a unique
equilibrium in which a2 = a2 > 0. Therefore, when  = 0 returns always display reversal. If
40 = 1, the condition is satised if
a1v + a1( + a
2
1u) < a2u( + a
2
1u):
Isolating v in the above expression yields:
v < ^ v 




which, since a1 does not depend on v (see (A.17)), gives an explicit upper bound on v. Hence,
if v < ^ v, there exists a ^  such that for all   ^  momentum occurs between the second and
third period returns along the equilibrium with high illiquidity. 2
41B Appendix
In this appendix we decompose the best response function to analyse the eects that impinge
on a rst period investor's responsiveness to private information. We start by using (8) to
compute an investor i's expectation of p2:
Ei1[p2] = Ei1 [E2[v] + 2E2[2]] (B.1)


































+ 2(a1(v   Ei1[v]) + 1):



































where E1 = =i1 denotes the optimal statistical weight to private information in the rst
period. The above expression shows that an investor's response to private information can be
decomposed in three terms:
 Term 1 captures the response to private signals that reects the anticipated impact of the
fundamentals information arriving at time 2 (i.e., how z2 aects E2[v]).
 Term 2 captures the response to private signals that reects the anticipated impact that
the innovation in liquidity trading has on the second period price (i.e., how u2 aects
E2[2]; note that while at date 1 an investor cannot predict u2, he can predict how the
market in period 2 will react to u2, since this is recorded by E2[2] = a2(v  E2[v])+2).
 Term 3 captures the response to private signals that reects the anticipated impact of
rst period liquidity trading on the second period price (i.e., how 1 aects E2[2]). This
reects investors' private learning channel from the rst period price.
Now, the three terms above behave dierently as a1 increases depending on the value of .
For  = 0, term 3 disappears while term 1 decreases in a1, reecting the fact that the more
42aggressively investors respond to private information in the rst period, the more the second and
rst period prices reect the fundamentals. This, in turn, leads investors to lower their reliance
on private information, consistently with the standard, strategic substitutability eect between
private and public information of the Grossman-Stiglitz setup. Term 2, instead, increases in
a1, reecting the fact that the more aggressively investors respond to private information, the
closer is the second period price to the fundamentals, and the lower is the uncertainty faced by
second period investors and the compensation they require for accommodating the demand of
liquidity traders in the second period. This latter eect runs counter to the one coming from
term 1 but is not strong enough to oset it. As a result, '0(a
1) < 0, a
1 <  in this case (see





















Figure 6: Case  = 0.
When  > 0 the private learning channel from p1 aects the response to private information
in period 1. This, in turn, implies that positive selection can occur in the second period and
that Vari1[p2] can be null.
The implication of this latter eect is to create two regions in the space of solutions to the
equation a1 = '(a1): [0;^ a1) and (^ a1;+1), where ^ a1 is such that Vari1[p2] is null for a1 = ^ a1.
Points to the left of ^ a1 yield the solution a
1 and points to the right of ^ a1 yield the solution
a
1 . We display the behavior of the three terms in Figure 7 (parameters' values are the same of
Figure 1). For a1 < ^ a1 we have that term 1 is non monotone (rst decreasing, then increasing)
in a1, term 2 is increasing in a1, and term 3 is negative and decreasing in a1. For a1 = ^ a1 all
three terms diverge (the rst and second to +1, the third to  1). For a1 > ^ a1 terms 1 and








































Figure 7: Case  = 0:5.
C Appendix
In this appendix we show that if un  N( u; 1
u ), with  u 6= 0, then the expected price in the
rst period can be written as in (27). To see this, suppose  u 6= 0, then, it is easy to that that
fz1;z2g is observationally equivalent to fp1;p2g, while
a
 1
1 (z1    u)  v + a
 1






 1(z2    u)  v + (a2)








v v + u
n X
t=1






As a result, everything works as in the model with  u = 0, except that now when  u < 0
rst period investors anticipate absorbing a positive supply of the asset at equilibrium and
thus require a compensation on the price they pay which lowers the expected price below the
unconditional expectation of the payo the more the higher is 1:
E[p1] =  v + 1 u <  v:
2
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